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STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS IN THE WAKE OF
ASSOCIATION OF DATA PROCESSING SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS, INC. V. CAMP.
The Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving standing
to challenge governmental actions; Association of Data Processing Serv-
ice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,' and Barlow v. Collins.2
The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. case
(Data Processing) is a competitor's suit seeking judicial review of an
administrative rule promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency.
On October 15, 1966, the Comptroller authorized national banks, inci-
dent to their banking services, to make data processing services avail-
able to other banks and bank customers.' Incident to this ruling the
American National Bank and Trust Company began performing data
processing services for two companies with whom Data Systems, Inc.,
a Minnesota corporation engaged in the data processing business, had
negotiated as prospective customers.
Plaintiffs, Data Systems, Inc., and ADAPSO,4 filed a complaint in
1. U.S., 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1970).
2. U.S., 38 U.S.L.W. 4195 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1970). The question presented in
Barlow was whether tenant farmers eligible for payments under the Upland Cotton
Program, enacted as part of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 1194, 7
U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 1444(d), had standing to challenge the validity of an amended
regulation promulgated in 1966 by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Upland Cotton
Program incorporates § 8(g) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act
of 1938, as amended, 52 Stat. 35, 205, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g), thereby permitting assign-
ments of payments only "as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop."
Prior to 1966, the regulation defined "making a crop" to exclude assignments to secure
"the payment of . . . rent of a farm." 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955). After the passage
of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, the Secretary amended the regulation to de-
fine "making a crop" to include assignments to secure "the payment of cash rent for
land used [for planting, cultivating or harvesting]." 31 Fed. Reg. 2815 (1966). Peti-
tioners alleged that the amended regulation provided their landlord with the oppor-
tunity to require the assignment of their benefits under the Upland Cotton Program as
a condition of obtaining a lease to work the land. As a result, they were being forced
to obtain financing from their landlord for their other farm needs, and since the land-
lord charged such high prices and rates of interest, the tenants' crop profits are
consumed each year in debt payments. The District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, in an unreported opinion, held that petitioners lacked standing because they
did not suffer an invasion of any legally protected interest. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 398 F.2d 398 (1969). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 395 U.S. 958 (1969).
3. The ruling stated: "Incident to its banking services, a national bank may
make available its data processing equipment or perform data processing services on
such equipment for other banks or bank customers," COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL FOR
NATIONAL BANKS 3500 (October 15, 1966 ed.).
4. An incorporated association of data service organizations domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania whose members, including Data Systems, Inc., perform data processing services
throughout the United States.
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the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on the
theory that marketing of data processing to the public by a national
bank is a violation of the National Bank Act.5  Named as defendants
were William B. Camp, Comptroller of the- Currency of the United
States and American National Bank and Trust Co. The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction and compensatory
damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the Comptroller had authorized
national banks to perform data processing services for bank customers in
violation of the Act which gives national banks only "such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."6
As a result ADAPSO members were threatened with the loss of a sub-
stantial part of the data processing market. In particular, Data Systems
had lost two prospective customers, whose data processing was now being
done by American National Bank. Jurisdiction was asserted by reason
of an alleged federal question arising under the National Bank Act.
The plaintiffs asserted standing to challenge the action of the Comp-
troller by virtue of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).7
The district court held 8 that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
their only injury was loss due to competition and not due to the invasion
of a legal right. The court stated that the APA was not designed to, and
in fact did not, change the basic principle that one threatened with in-
jury by governmental action does not have standing to challenge such
action "-unless the right invaded is a legal right.-" ' 9  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed1" stating that a
plaintiff could challenge allegedly illegal competition only when it pur-
sued: (1) a legal interest by reason of a public charter or contract;
(2) a legal interest by reason of statutory protection; or (3) a "public
interest" in which Congress had recognized the need for review of ad-
ministrative action, and the plaintiff was sufficiently involved to
have standing to represent the public." The court found that the facts
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (1964).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq (1964). The plaintiffs also alleged that § 4 of the
Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132 (1962),,12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964), gave
standing since if a legislative purpose can be found to protect a competitive interest,
the injured competitor has standing to sue under the rationale of Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Brief for Petitioners at 20, Association of Data
Processing Service Organiations, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 1. Section 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act provides that: "No bank service corporation may engage in
any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
8. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
9. Id. at 678.
10. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 842.
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clearly placed the plaintiffs *outside the authority of those cases which
recognized standing.12  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.1 3  The
Court reversed stating three requisites for standing. First, the plain-
tiff must allege that the challenged action has caused him "injury
in fact."' 4 Second, the interest sought to be protected by the complaint
must be arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Third,
judicial review must not be precluded.
The decision in Data Processing is significant primarily because it
marks the first interpretation of section 10(a) of the APA by the Su-
preme Court. A majority of the lower court cases interpreting it held
that section 10(a) merely codified the common law of standing.' 5 Un-
der that common law, in the absence of a specific authorization of ju-
dicial review, the complainant was required to show the invasion of a
legal right.' 6 The Supreme Court in Data Processing interpreted sec-
tion 10(a) much more broadly. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
stated that the legal interest test had no place in the doctrine of standing,
as it was a question which was essentially related to the merits of the
case.17
The Traditional View of Standing
The standing requirement finds its origin in Article III, Section 2,
12. Id. at 843.
13. 395 U.S. 976 (1969).
14. See page 289, infra.
15. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 130 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Harrison-
Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Financing Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th
Cir. 1962); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D. Mass. 1968),
af 'd, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), judgment vacated 38 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Mar. 24,
1970); See Comment, The Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering
of the Standing Barrier, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 96, 99 (1969).
16. In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) the Supreme Couri
stated that:
'... It is an ancient maxim, that a damage to one, without an injury in this
sense, (damnum absque injuria), does not lay the foundation of an action; be-
* cause, if the act complained of does not violate any of his legal rights, it is
obvious, that he has no cause to complain. . . . Want of right and want of
remedy are justly said to be reciprocal. When therefore there has been a vio-
lation of a right, the person injured is entitled to an action.' . . . The con-
verse is equally true, that where, although there is damage, there is no viola-
tion of a right no action can be maintained.
See Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 140 (1939); See also JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 509 (1958) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE]. "
- 17. See note 1, supra at 4194. After outlining the three tests discussed by the
Court of Appeals, Justice Douglas stated that:
Those tests were based on prior decisions.of this Court, such as Tennessee
Power Co. v.. TVA. . . . The "legal interest' test goes to the merits;. The
question of standing is different.
See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers. and Others, 35 U. Ca. L. Rv. 601, 620 (1968).
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of the Constitution which provides for the judicial power of the federal
courts to extend to all "cases" and "controversies." The Supreme
Court has interpreted Aritcle III, Section 2 to require that contro-
versies be "-presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process."' 8 A con-
stitutional claim by a citizen against a government official is not a justi-
ciable "controversy" unless the citizen shows that he has a personal
stake in the outcome.1  The question of who possesses the required
personal stake is customarily discussed in terms of "standing." 20  The
Court in Flast v. Cohen2 enumerated the two objectives of the Article
Ill standing requirement. The first is the creation of a judicial context
in which:
[T]he questions will be framed with the necessary specificity ....
the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and...
the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure
that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form tradi-
tionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution. 22
The second objective is the avoidance of the employment of -"a federal
court as a forum in which to air.., generalized grievances about the
conduct of government ... .
The question of standing is not, however, simply a constitutional
question. As the Court stated in Flast:
Additional uncertainty exists in the doctrine of justiciability because
that doctrine has become a blend of constitutional requirements
and policy considerations. And a policy limitation is 'not always
clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitation.' Barrow v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).24
Indeed, the Court in Data Processing, also citing Barrows, stated that
apart from the Article III limitations, the question of standing involved
a "rule of self-restraint for its . . . [The Court's] own governance. '25
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice White joined, wrote a separate
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
19. Professor Davis, supra note 17, at 616, states that: "I know of no federal case
in which a plaintiff was held to have standing without asserting an interest of his own."
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
20. 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATE LAW TREATISE § 22.01 (1959).
21. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
22. Id. at 106.
23. Id. at 97.
24. Id.
25. See note 1, supra at 4194. In Barrows the Court allowed white property own-
ers to assert the constitutional rights of Negroes as a defense to an action for dam-
ages for violating a restrictive covenant. In allowing the defendants to assert the
rights of others the Court acknowledged that it was breaking from a past course of
conduct, but indicated that it could properly do so, since the rule of self-restraint
which would be violated was not constitutional in nature.
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"concurring and dissenting" opinion in Data Processing in which he
indicated that the constitutional barriers to standing were the only ones
which the Court should recognize. 20  He stated that:
By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes
very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that condi-
tioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged
governmental action invaded one of his legally protected interests."7
Standing could traditionally be asserted in one of two ways. First,
it could be asserted by reason of the invasion of an interest protected by
law-the "legal interest" test.28  The effect of the application of this
test was that often one who was injured by illegal or unconstitutional ad-
ministrative action was held to lack standing because there was no in-
vasion of a "legal interest. ' 29  In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,"0 the
Court stated that:
It is by now clear that neither damage nor loss of income in conse-
quence of the action of Government, which is not an invasion of
recognized legal rights, is in itself a source of legal rights in the
absence of constitutional legislation recognizing it as such.$'
Congress has provided such "constitutional legislation"3 2 in the form
26. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). Justice Brennan further indi-
cated that these constitutional requirements were fulfilled by compliance with the "in-jury in fact" test. This position seems to be in accord with the views expressed by
Justice Douglas in Data Processing and Barlow. In Barlow, Douglas said:
First, there is no doubt that in the context of this litigation the tenant farmers,
petitioners here, have the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete
adverseness required by Article III. 38 U.S.L.W., at 4197.
Justice Douglas then proceeded to examine the second and third requirements estab-
lished in Data Processing to determine if the petitioner had fulfilled them, and would
be granted standing.
27. Id. at 4198. Justice Brennan further argues that the majority's approach will
cause unnecessary confusion on the standing issue. Instead, he would restrict standing
to the constitutional inquiry previously discussed, and then consider the related, but
separate, question of reviewability. In practical effect there may be little difference
between the results obtained under these two systems, since in determining review-
ability, Justice Brennan would look to the same indicia which Justice Douglas analyzed
in finding that the second and third requirements (the "zone of interests" and preclusion
of reviewability tests) of the Court's "standing" test was fulfilled.
28. See note 16, supra.; In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938), the
Court stated that the complainant was required to allege the violation of a legal right.
In Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), the Court outlined the "rights"
that would be afforded protection:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct and special
injury by the act of an agent of the government, which, but for statutory au-
thority for its performance, would be a violation of the statute in a suit
against the agent. The principle is without application unless the right in-
vaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one pro-
tected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers
a privilege. Id. at 137.
29. Professor Davis states the opinion that the law of standing is artificial to the
extent that a person who is injured in fact by administrative action is held to lack
standing to challenge the legality of that action. 3 DAvis, supra note 20.
30. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
31. Id. at 125.
32. The phrase "constitutional legislation" which was used by the Court in Perkins
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of "peion aggrieved" provisions of certain statiutes. 3 The second way
standing could traditionally be asserted, therefore, was by alleging stat-
utory authorization for judicial review by "aggrieved" or "adversely af-
fected" persons.
In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,84 the Court was called on to
interpret the impact of a statute allowing attack on an administrative
decision by an "aggrieved" person. The Court stated that the eco-
nomic injury suffered by a rival station when the FCC granted a li-.
cense to a new station was not, at least when considered alone, such an
injury as would allow standing. The Court however, then stated:
Congress has some purpose in enacting §402(b)(2). It may have
been of [the] opinion that one likely to be financially injured by
the issue of a license would be the only person having sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of
law in the action of the Commission in granting the license. 3.5
On this basis the Court found that standing existed. For standing to
exist under such a statutory provision the complainant must, have
"[S]ome special and peculiar interest which may be directly and mate-
rially affected by alleged unlawful action.
seems to be a misnomer, for it is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that the
Congress may not, by ordinary legislative means, expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts beyond the limits established by Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Thus, the legislation the Court discussed apparently had the effect of removing those
barriers to standing which were non-constitutional in nature, but had been judicially
superimposed over the "case" or "controversy" requirements of Article III, section 2.
33. The list of statutory provisions granting judicial review is a long one. The
usual provision allows standing to one "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by agency
action; Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964).' The Securities Act
allows standing to "any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission," 15 U.S.C.
§ 7711(a) (1964). The same effect is achieved by allowing standing to "any person
disclosing a substantial interest" in an order, Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964) or to "any person in interest," Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1
(20) (1964)'. A somewhat narrower provision allows standing to "any party to a pro-
ceeding . . . aggrieved by an order. .- . ." Federal'Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b)
(1964) and the Federal Trade Commission Act allows standing only to those required
to cease and desist by a Commission order, 15 U.S.C. §- 45(c) (1964). See JAIFE,
supra note 16, at 602; Davis, supra note 17; at .618; Note, Competitors' Standing to
Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 843, 844'.(1956).
34. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
• 35. Id. at 477. "
36. L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,- 311 U.S 295, 304 (1940) The
suit in D" Singer was brought* under the Transportation Act "of 1920 which irr "Para-
graph' 20, § 402, provided that suit -for injunction may be instituted by the United
States . . . or any 'party in interest' Such -a suit cannot be instituted by an individual
unless he 'possesses something more than a common concern for obedience to" law.'"
Id. at 303. Professor Jaffe has stated the contrary position. He contends that:
Judge Frank in the well known' Associated Industries case believed, cor-
rectly in my opinion, that under Sanders as reinforced by Scripps-Howard it is
not a necessary element of the constitutional requirement of case -or con-
trovefsy that the plaintiff have any interest. ' It is enough that the statutes
authorize him to represent the public interest as a 'private -Attorney General.'
JAFFE, supra note 16, at 517.
This opinion was reinforced by: Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Ac-
tio'is: ",The 'Nofi-Hohfeldidn 'or Ideological Pladntiff, 1.16 .U. PA. L. REv.. 1033-(1968).
290
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The scope of review the petitioner is entitled to receive under an
"aggrieved person" provision is limited. 7  In Scripps-Howard Radio
v. FCC,38 the Court said:
The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights.
The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in com-
munications. By §402(b) (2) Congress gave the right of appeal to
persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by
Commission action. . . . But these private litigants have standing
only as representatives of the public interest. 39
As a representative of the public interest, the complainant has standing
only "to vindicate the public interest."4
One other method by which standing was infrequently gained was by
asserting the invasion of an interest implicitly intended by Congress
to be protected absent a provision for review by "aggrieved" or "ad-
versely affected" persons. In the Chicago Junction Case,4 the Inter-
state Commerce Commission authorized the New York Central railroad
to take exclusive control of the terminal railroads in Chicago, in place
of the common control that had existed. In a sifit by New, York Cen-
tral's competitors, the Court stated that the Transportation Act of 1920
was intended to protect the competitors' interest. Mr. Justice Brandeis
said:
By reason of this legislation, the plaintiffs, being competitors of the
New York Central and users of the terminal railroads theretofore
neutral, have a special interest in the proposal to transfer the
control to that company.4 2
Mr. Justice Harlan based his dissenting opinion in Flast on Jaffe's interpretation of the
Associated Industries decision. Justice Harlan stated that:
It does not . .. follow that suits brought by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs are
excluded by the "case or controversy" clause of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. . . . This and other federal courts have repeatedly held that individual
litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as "represen-
tatives of the public interest." 392 U.S., at 120.
Professor Davis contends that Professor Jaffe's interpretation is incorrect. Profes-
sor Davis states that:
Even though the law of standing is so cluttered. and confused -that almost
every proposition has -some exception, the federal courts have consistently
adhered to one major proposition, without exception: one who has no inter-
est of his own at stake always lacks standing. Davis, supra note 17, at 617.
See also Singer, Justiciability and RecentSupreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229,
280 (1969).
37. Professor Jaffe states that the question of standing 'is sometimes difficult to
divorce from the question of what issues a 'standee may raise. JAFFE, supra note 16, at
513. See Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional lus Tertii in the'.Supreme Court,
71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962). See generally 3 DAVIS, supra dote 20, at §§ 22.06, 22.07.
38. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
39. Id. at 14.
- 40. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 705 (2nd Cir.), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943).
41. 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
42. 'Id. at-267.. -
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Although Chicago Junction indicates the Court's establishment of a
statutory intent to protect test, 43 a significant step in the law of standing,
later cases detracted from its importance as a stepping stone toward
broader grants of standing." The recent case of Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co.,45 however, seems to have re-established the validity of this
proposition.
The Impact of the APA
The decisions of the courts of appeal in Data Processing, and Bar-
low46 indicate that those courts viewed section 10(a) of the APA as a
mere codification of the two methods of asserting standing discussed
above. Section 10(a) provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 47
In order to determine why a majority of the courts interpreted Section
10(a) as a codification of the existing law of standing we must look to
the legislative history.48  The APA was derived from two earlier bills,
the McCarran Bill49 and the Sumners Bill, 50 both of which provided
that: "Any person adversely affected by any agency action shall be en-
titled to judicial review thereof in accordance with this section." It can
clearly be seen that at this stage a change in the existing law was antici-
pated. During the Senate Committee hearings on this section, however,
it was rewritten to provide that: "Any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action shall be entitled to judicial review." 5' 1
The section was then revised a third time,5 2 the result being the present
text of section 10(a). The additional language in the final draft, "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of any relevant
statute," appears to refer to the "aggrieved person" provisions in earlier
statutes, and thus may be viewed as a completion of the codification
begun in the second draft.53 Uncertainty exists, however, because both
43. Professor Jaffe states that when the legislature recognizes an interest ". . . as
on which must be heeded, it is such a 'legally protected interest' as warrants standing
to complain of its disregard." JAFFE, supra note 16, at 508.
44. See note 41, supra; See Note, The Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A
Judicial Lowering of the Standing Barrier, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 96, 100-101 (1969).
45. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
46. 406 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1969); 398 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967).
48. See note 15, supra.
49. S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1945).
50. H.R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1945).
51. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11, 36 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1946).
52. Id.
53. Professor Davis, on the other hand, would view section 10(a) as merely pro-
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committee reports on the final version stated that: "This subsection
confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected in fact by
agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute."54  Sen-
ator McCarran, however, quoted the Attorney General's statement that:
"This reflects existing law," 5 as did a committee member.5 6 Notwith-
standing these comments, Professor Davis claims that:
When both committee reports are so clear in translating the statu-
tory words 'adversely affected' to mean 'adversely affected in fact,'
the reasons in favor of following that interpretation are rather
powerful, except to the extent that other legislative history is in-
consistent. In general, the rest of the legislative history clutters
up the question more than it detracts from the committees' state-
ments. 57
Professor Jaffe, on the other hand, contends that even though the
Attorney General's statement is not so authoritative as to control, when
it is taken into consideration "-[I]t does throw into high relief the
omission of the words 'in fact.' "8 Therefore, Jaffe contends that
Professor Davis' view is "-logically very difficult to support." 59
Perhaps because of the confused state of its legislative history, the
judicial interpretations of section 10(a), at least prior to Data Process-
ing, have done little to clarify its scope. In American President Lines
v. Federal Maritime Board,60 a district court analogized the phraseology
"adversely affected or aggrieved" in section 10(a) to that language in
the Federal Communications Act. The court then found that:
If a competitor who fears adverse economic effects, has a right
to challenge the legality of official action under one of the Acts,
the conclusion is inescapable that he may do so under the other
Act. 61
The court then went on to say that, "-[T]he Administrative Procedure
Act is no mere codification of pre-existing law."' 62  Two years after the
viding a general statutory grant of standing applicable to all agencies where review is
not precluded which is similar in nature to the various "person aggrieved" provisions
which have been previously discussed. See note 33, supra. Professor Davis would still
argue, however, that these statutes remove only non-constitutional barriers and may be
applied only when the petitioner is adversely affected in fact so as to fulfill the "case"
or "controversy" requirement. See note 64, infra. See also Note, Competitor's Standing
to Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 843, 858
(1956).
54. S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 42 (1946).
55. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 212, 310 (1946).
56. 92 CONG. REC. 2984-85 (Rep. Hobbs).
57. 3 DAVIS, supra note 20, at 212.
58. JAFFE, supra note 16, at 529.
59. Id.
60. 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953).
61. Id. at 349.
62. Id.
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American President Lines decision it was overruled by the Circuit Court
of'Appeals for the District of Columbia in Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay.63 In that case the court held that section 10(a) did not
alter prior law. The court, relying on the Attorney General's comment,
expressly rejected the American President Lines interpretation. 64  This
interpretation was also adopted by courts in three other circuits. 5
A well reasoned contrary interpretation can be found in Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,66 where the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that they did not think that
the language in section 10(a) should be construed to limit judicial re-
view to situations where Congress has provided "person aggrieved" or
"adversely affected" provisions in specific statutes. They stated that
this interpretation would conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,8 7 which indicated that the APA's
"generous" review provisions should be given a "hospitable" interpreta-
tion. They then stated that in view of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 8
they would consider a person attempting to assert the invasion of a
personal interest which a relevant statute was specifically intended to
protect, as adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of that
relevant statute. 69
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Data Processing, then, the
circuit courts were split on the correct interpretation of section 10(a).
Although some legislative history indicated that section 10(a) was a
mere codification of existing law, other history indicated that the section
63. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
64. Id. at 932.
65. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76
(E.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Harrison-Halsted Community Group v.
Housing & Home Finance Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), judgment vacated, - U.S. -, 38 U.S.L.W. 3366
(U.S. Mar. 24, 1970).
66. 395 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1968).
67. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
68. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Though the court in Norwalk could probably reach its de-
cision solely on the basis of:Hardin's authority, the decision is noteworthy primarily
for its interpretation of the APA's provisions. Hardin did not involve an interpretation
of the APA.
. 69. See, note 66, supra, at 933 n.26. In Abbott Laboratories, the Court stated
that the legislative history manifests a congressional intent that the APA cover a broad
area of administrative actions. The Court then stated that: ". . . this Court has
echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure Act's 'generous review
provision' must be given 'hospitable' interpretation." See note 67, supra, at 140. In
Hardin, the Court adopted the "intent to protect" test when it stated:
. it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case .. . that
when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative
purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing
to require compliance with that provision. 390 U.S, at 6.
See Note, The Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Stand-
ing Barrier, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 96, 102 (1969).
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was intended to establish a new right to review. This same confusion
could be expected to permeate the judicial interpretation of the section,
and we have seen ample evidence that it did. The Supreme Court in
Abbott Laboratories and Hardin indicated that the right of judicial
review should be more freely granted, but it was not until the decision
in Data Processing that the doubts about the interpretation of Section
10(a) were resolved.
The Impact of Data Processing and Barlow
The extent to which the existing law of standing has been changed
by the Data Processing and Barlow decisions can be highlighted by
examining the First Circuit's decision in a similar case, Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp."0 In that case the complainant asserted that the Comp-
troller of the Currency has authorized national banks to enter the travel
agency business in violation of the National Bank Act. Petitioner's
allegation of standing was based, as it was in Data Processing upon
section 10(a) of the APA. Plaintiffs argued. that section 10(a)
granted standing to any person claiming to be adversely affected in
fact. In denying standing, the court expressly acknowledged that the
plaintiff's argument was derived from Professor Davis' interpretation of
section 10(a). The court then stated that they chose to side with Pro-
fessor Jaffe and the majority of courts in holding that section 10(a) was
a codification of the prior law of standing. 71
The Supreme Court in Data Processing, on the other hand, adopted
the position championed by Professor Davis and expanded the federal
law of standing.72 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated
that: "The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the chal-
lenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. '73
Justice Douglas said that the question of standing is different from the
inquiry into the existence of a "legal interest" in which the Court in
70. 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), judgment vacated, - U.S. -, 38 U.S.L.W. 3366
(U.S. Mar. 24, 1970).
71. Id. at 1151.
72. Professor Davis has stated that:
Reform of federal law of standing should be easy, for all that is needed is
application of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, which confers
standing upon a person who is 'adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute.' . . . the federal courts
should, in my opinion, recognize that standing of 'any person adversely af-
fected in fact by agency action. K. DAViS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTIcE 159 (1969).
73. See- note 1, supra, emphasis added. The decision in Data Processing does
not appear to be limited to competitor suits.. The Court stated that:
We mention these noneconomic values ['aesthetic, conservational, and rec-
reational' and: 'a .spiritual stake in First Amendment values'] to emphasize
that standing may stem from them as well as from the economic injury on
which petitioner relies here. Id. at 4194.
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Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA,7 4 had engaged. Assuming the petitioner
satisfies the prior constitutional requirement, in order to obtain standing
he must then make a showing that the interest he sought to have pro-
tected is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 75  More-
over, it indicated that these "zones of interest" may reflect "aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational" values as well as economic ones.7 6
Justice Douglas then pointed out that the trend is toward expanding
the class of people who may challenge administrative action. He found
this trend significant in discussing the Court's third criteria for standing:
that judicial review has not been precluded. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act provides that its review provisions apply "except to the ex-
tent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."'77  Justice Douglas then stated
that this provision should be construed narrowly because in Shaugh-
nessy v. Pedrino,7T they had referred to "the generous review provi-
sions" of the APA, and in that and other cases had construed the APA
"as serving a broadly remedial purpose." 79  The Court reinforced this
opinion by stating that there is no presumption against judicial review
unless that purpose is clearly discernible in the statutory scheme."'
74. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). It appears that Tennessee Power Co. is overruled to the
extent that it requires the assertion of the invasion of a "legal interest." Justice Doug-
las stated that: "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits." 38 U.S.L.W., at 4194.
75. 38 U.S.L.W., at 4194. It has been contended that the Court too often con-
fuses standing with the substantive issues of the case. Lewis, Constitutional Rights
and the Misuse of "Standing." 14 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962).
76. 38 U.S.L.W., at 4194. Two cases were cited in support of this proposition;
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965) and
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court in
Scenic Hudson was asked to review the Federal Power Commission's grant of a license
to Consolidated Edison to construct a hydroelectric project on the Hudson River.
The court held:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately pro-
tect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational as-
pects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have
exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the
class of 'aggrieved' parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal
Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.
354 F.2d, at 616.
In United Church of Christ the court upheld the standing of representatives of the
listening audience to contest the renewal of a broadcast license. Mr. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stated that: "There is
nothing unusual or novel in granting the consuming public standing to challenge ad-
ministrative actions." 359 F.2d, at 1002.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. II, 1967).
78. 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
79. 38 U.S.L.W., at 4195. Even discretionary action may be reviewable for abuse
of discretion. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965).
80. Id. In Barlow, Justice Douglas made the Court's position entirely clear:
As we said in Data Processing Service, preclusion of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action adjudicating private rights is not lightly to be inferred. ...
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Conclusion
Data Processing appears to be a step toward the philosophy of the
late Edmond Cahn, who said:
Some consumers need bread; others need Shakespeare; others need
their rightful place in the national society-what they all need is
processors of law who will consider the people's needs more signifi-
cant than administrative convenience.8l
Whether for the consumer, competitor or the citizen, the Court is mov-
ing to the preferred position of allowing standing to those who are
"injured in fact." This will be particularly true if the Court construes
liberally its requirement that the petitioner's interest be "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the stat-
ute. . . ." If the Court extends its "zone of interests" to cover those
who logically might be, at least secondarily, considered in enacting the
statute in question, it appears that most people who can fulfill the "case"
or "controversy" requirement may be able to gain standing to challenge
the actions of federal administrative agencies.
WILLIAM A. MCLAIN
Indeed, judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonre-
viewability an exception which must be demonstrated. 38 U.S.L.W., at 4197.
81. Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1963)
cited by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005
(1966). Professor Cahn has another friend on the Court. Mr. Justice Burger said in his
concurring opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110 (1968), that:
The late Edmond Cahn stated my philosophy. He emphasized the importance
of the role that the federal judiciary was designed to play in guarding basic
rights against majoritarian control.
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